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ABSTRACT 
 
China is a latecomer to preferential trading agreements (PTAs), choosing to 
complete its accession to the WTO before embarking on negotiations for 
preferential agreements. Since 2001, China has become a very active player 
in such agreements, currently having concluded treaties or being in the 
process of negotiating them with close to 30 partners. China’s approach to 
PTAs is characterized by pragmatism; rather than following the American and 
European practices of using a template for all partnerships, China has been 
willing to tailor agreements to the specific relationships it is pursuing. Like 
other governments, China has a mixture of motives in pursuing PTAs. In 
some relationships, diplomatic/strategic considerations are paramount. In 
others, China seeks to pursue various economic interests, one of the most 
significant of which has been security of supply of raw materials. China’s 
various motivations in PTAs are examined through three case studies: the 
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement with Hong Kong; the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area; and the negotiation of a PTA with Australia. 
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Participation in the global trading regime has been a major factor in the rise of 
Chinese economic power. China’s accession to the WTO provided it with the 
relative security of market access that it had long sought and helped reinforce 
China’s place in East Asian production networks.1 Moreover, preparation for 
WTO entry as well as implementation of the terms of China’s accession 
agreement, reflected principally in a slashing of tariffs and the removal of 
many non-tariff barriers, provided a significant stimulus to the competitiveness 
of the local economy (Lardy, 2002; Noble, Ravenhill and Doner, 2005). 
China, however, was a latecomer to preferential trading agreements 
(PTAs).2 Unlike other Northeast Asian economies, particularly Japan and 
Korea, China’s reluctance to jump on board the preferential trade bandwagon 
owed little to concerns that these arrangements might undermine the 
multilateral trade framework. Rather, it was a pragmatic response to the 
sensitivities of negotiations over its WTO accession—Beijing was unwilling to 
embark on preferential negotiations until its entry to the WTO had been 
successfully concluded. 
Pragmatism has remained the hallmark of China’s economic diplomacy 
in the years since WTO entry. Countries use economic instruments to pursue 
a variety of foreign policy objectives—some of which may be far removed 
from securing domestic economic benefit, narrowly conceived. The 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements is no exception to this 
generalization. In East Asia over the last decade, countries have negotiated 
PTAs with relatively insignificant economic partners—sometimes because 
they wanted to gain experience in negotiating these agreements (for instance, 
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Singapore with New Zealand, Korea with Chile), or primarily for political 
reasons (most obviously in Taiwan’s negotiation of PTAs with Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, two of the relatively small number of countries that accord Taiwan 
diplomatic recognition). But even where the other party is a relatively 
significant economic partner, the motivations for negotiating the agreement 
may be as much political-strategic as economic—seen, for instance, in 
Singapore’s efforts to “anchor” its relationships with all of its major strategic 
partners—the United States, India, Japan, and China—by negotiating (often 
‘unequal’) trade agreements with them. Preferential trade agreements thus 
are instruments that may facilitate the pursuit of multiple objectives—not 
necessarily as alternatives but sometimes simultaneously within a single 
agreement. 
In this paper, we examine China’s pursuit of PTAs in the period since 
2001. Table One lists China’s current activity in negotiating and implementing 
PTAs. As this table illustrates, China has become a very active player in 
negotiating PTAs in the brief period since its accession to the WTO. As the 
world’s second largest and fastest growing economy, China is an attractive 
PTA partner for many governments, despite the potential threat that its 
exports may pose to their domestic manufacturing. The potential demand for 
PTAs with China from other countries therefore is likely to exceed China’s 
capacity to negotiate these agreements—even before taking into 
considerations those agreements that China itself might want to initiate. The 
FTA division of MOFCOM, the Chinese government agency with principal 
responsibility for negotiating PTAs, has a professional staff of around 20, of 
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whom only a dozen in 2006 were experienced negotiators [Interviews, Beijing, 
June 2006]. The division’s resources were already so severely stretched by 
2005 that the Ministry’s WTO division took responsibility for handling the PTA 
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, the two industrialized 
economies with which China is currently negotiating. 
Given these bureaucratic constraints, China’s choice of negotiating 
partners gives a clear indication of the government’s priorities in using PTAs 
as a foreign policy instrument. Those negotiations that Beijing itself chose to 
initiate provide the clearest evidence. But so too, given the range of keen 
partners, do the invitations that Beijing has chosen to accept from other 
countries. Table One indicates that China has initiated less than half of the 
PTA negotiations on which it has embarked. From this listing, we can deduce 
four categories of partnerships, and their various motivations, that China has 
chosen to pursue:  
• those intended to facilitate Chinese production networks—the economic 
partnership agreements signed with Hong Kong and Macau;  
• proposals for agreements with neighbouring states (ASEAN, India, Japan 
and Korea) that China has made, initially at least primarily out of 
diplomatic considerations (although potential economic benefits certainly 
should not be entirely discounted);  
• relationships, primarily initiated by China, with resource-rich 
countries/regional groupings, intended to enhance China’s security of 
supply of raw materials (Brazil, Gulf Cooperation Council, Southern 
African Customs Union); 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2007-18 4
• invitations for negotiations, initiated by relatively small, resource-rich 
industrialized economies (Australia and New Zealand), that China has 
accepted. 
In the second half of this paper we examine three of these relationships in 
more detail—those with Hong Kong, ASEAN, and Australia. First we look at 
the more general influences on China’s PTAs. 
China’s PTAs in Comparative Context 
We begin by highlighting a number of dimensions on which China’s PTAs 
differ in their content and their motivations from those of other countries. 
First, China, unlike particularly the United States and the EU, but also 
Japan, has no single template for its PTAs. Again, this is an indicator of the 
pragmatic approach that China has taken: its agreements negotiated to date 
vary substantially in their content. Some cover only trade in goods (and may 
have partial coverage of this trade), some include services and investment. 
Second, China has been happy to sign vague framework agreements 
whose details have subsequently to be negotiated—behaviour that accords 
well with the practices of other states in East Asia, and brings to mind the 
caustic comment about the ASEAN Free Trade Area, namely that its acronym 
stood for “Agree First, Talk After”. 
Third, China has shown no great concern for the compatibility of its 
agreements with WTO rules that permit regional trade agreement as an 
exception to the requirement that members should provide most-favoured-
nation status to one another. Officials and academics have been content 
merely to state that the rules of the WTO clearly acknowledge the legitimacy 
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of regional trade agreements, and China should take advantage of the 
flexibility this entails.3 This stance is in marked contrast to that of Japan and 
the EU, which have frequently resorted to tortuous reasoning in attempting to 
demonstrate the incomplete agreements they have negotiated are compatible 
with the requirement under Article XXIV that regional agreements must cover 
“substantially all the trade” between partners. In part, this relaxed attitude to 
WTO rules may be because agreements that China signs with other countries 
that classify themselves as “developing” in the WTO (which includes, for 
instance, its agreement with ASEAN) are not subject to Article XXIV but to the 
even laxer requirements of the “Enabling Clause”. 
Fourth, unlike Japan where the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry has argued repeatedly that PTAs can be an important instrument for 
enhancing competitiveness in the domestic economy and, in particular, for 
exposing traditionally protected sectors, most notably agriculture, to 
international competition, the Chinese government in its official statements on 
PTA negotiations has made little reference to the potentially beneficial 
competitive effects of PTAs on the domestic economy.4
Fifth, again in marked contrast to the EU and the United States, whose 
PTAs frequently have a mercantilist character—being designed with the 
intention of opening foreign markets to their exports—the unequal character 
of the PTAs that Beijing has signed to date has been to the advantage of 
China’s partners. Again, this can be attributed both to China’s pragmatic 
approach and to its desire to use economic instruments for diplomatic 
advantage. The unequal obligations are particularly noticeable in the “Early 
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Harvest” provisions of the agreements with ASEAN and with Pakistan. In 
these instances, Beijing has chosen not to make use of the asymmetries in 
economic power between the parties to its own economic advantage, opting 
instead to use the PTAs as assurance mechanisms against fears by the 
weaker parties of Chinese economic domination. In the ASEAN agreement in 
particular, Beijing was willing to accept ASEAN exports of agricultural 
products fully cognizant that these would damage domestic producers in 
provinces bordering ASEAN. This reluctance to capitalize on its relative 
power has not carried over, however, to its negotiations with Australia and 
New Zealand, where Beijing has been insistent on minimizing damage to its 
vulnerable domestic sectors, particularly agriculture. And, of course, some will 
see Beijing’s willingness to agree to “unequal” treaties as merely an expedient 
approach in which some economic interests are sacrificed in the short-term in 
order to secure long-term gains. 
China’s willingness to accept agreements that discriminate against its 
interests is the classical behaviour of a benevolent hegemonic power, 
reminiscent of the US tolerance of discrimination against its exports by its 
European and Northeast Asian allies in the period after 1945. One 
consideration in China’s policies has been rivalry over leadership of the East 
Asian region, the area to which China gives top priority in its diplomacy. China 
has attempted to position itself advantageously vis-à-vis Japan in its dealings 
with smaller economies in the region. In its negotiations with ASEAN 
economies, Japan’s behaviour has resembled that of the EU and the US in 
their negotiations with weaker parties—Tokyo has been very reluctant to 
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make any concessions that would adversely affect domestic interests. 
Japan’s agreement with Singapore was markedly unequal, with the latter 
having to agree to far greater openness of its market than Japan was 
prepared to offer to secure an agreement. Beijing’s concessions on imports of 
agricultural products through the Early Harvest provisions of the ASEAN 
agreement placed it in a particularly favourable light compared with Tokyo’s 
(and Seoul’s) unwillingness to make concessions on agricultural imports in 
the PTAs they have negotiated with ASEAN states. Beijing is acutely aware of 
the alternative designs for East Asian regionalism that have been put forward, 
and believes that it alone—through the CAFTA Agreement—has implemented 
a practical mechanism for moving regional cooperation forward.5 Beyond 
reassuring regional states about its intentions, China’s pragmatic stance on 
PTAs is intended to reinforce its claims to be the natural leader of a 
developing country coalition within the global economic system, with the 
potential benefit of enhancing its bargaining position within the WTO. 
The Economic Dimension 
Even in those instances where China’s proposals for PTAs were initially 
driven primarily by diplomatic/strategic considerations, as in the CAFTA 
relationship, economic considerations inevitably were not entirely absent—
and came into greater prominence once negotiations on the agreements 
began. 
A primary economic objective in China’s negotiation of PTAs is to 
ensure better treatment than Beijing enjoys within the WTO, where it has 
been disadvantaged in part because of the concessions that it was forced to 
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make in the accession negotiations. Foremost here is the desire to be treated 
as a market economy by its trading partners, a status that would render 
Chinese exports less vulnerable to arbitrary anti-dumping actions. Partners’ 
recognition of China as a market economy has been a non-negotiable 
precondition for the opening of PTA negotiations. The desire to gain 
recognition as a market economy appears to have influenced the choice of 
invitations for PTAs that Beijing has accepted. It is probably no coincidence 
that China’s first negotiation of a PTA with an industrialized economy was 
with New Zealand, the third smallest of the OECD economies (after Iceland 
and Luxembourg)—and therefore a relationship in which the asymmetry in 
economic power was most marked. Once New Zealand conceded recognition 
of market economy status, Australia, the next industrialized economy to enter 
negotiations, had no alternative but to follow suit. China’s next choice of 
industrialized economies as a PTA partner was the smallest of the OECD 
members, Iceland. One reason for the delay in the opening of negotiations of 
the proposed PTA between China and India has been the reluctance of the 
latter to accord China market economy status. 
A second factor dominant in many of the negotiations that Beijing has 
initiated, and in its choice of proposals for PTAs it has accepted, has been the 
desire to enhance China’s access to raw materials. China’s sustained rapid 
economic growth has rested on enormous increases in imports of raw 
materials and particularly of energy.6 China’s increasing dependence on 
imports has led to a dramatic expansion of the country’s economic diplomacy 
with all parts of the global economy. Beijing’s forays in Africa have attracted a 
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great deal of critical attention but it has been equally active in resource 
diplomacy in Latin America, the Middle East and in Central Asia. From 2004 
to 2006, the National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC) 
released a series of policy notices on the measures to support “important 
projects encouraged by the government”. The measures include giving 
preference in granting licenses by the NDRC, as well as providing loans and 
financial insurance, financing support, and establishing risk security 
mechanism through the China Import & Export Bank, the China Export & 
Credit Insurance Corporation (SinoSure), and the China Development Bank.  
PTAs have been part of the arsenal of diplomatic weapons that China 
has brought to bear in its quest to enhance its resource security. At the very 
least, signature of a PTA, assuming a reasonably non-confrontational process 
of negotiation, can be expected to provide an improved context for the 
operations of China’s major resource corporations. Here it is not a matter so 
much of facilitating production networks but the operations of giant vertically-
integrated corporations. More specifically, China has sought to ensure that 
PTAs will end any discrimination against its resource investments and deliver 
at least most favoured nation treatment in its partner economies—the 
Australian case, discussed below, provides a good example. And China has 
sought to include provisions in its PTAs that enable its resource companies to 
bring in Chinese labour to staff its resource projects. Beyond these specific 
measures, it is not clear what PTAs can deliver to China, and whether 
Beijing’s expectations are realistic—it has referred, for instance, in the PTA 
negotiations with Australia to securing access to resources at “reasonable” 
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prices. The Australian government had explained that prices in the resource 
were set by private company decisions, which was not controlled by the state 
because Australia was a market economy. Nonetheless, Chinese officials 
believed the Australian government should still have been able to restrain 
such company behaviour.7 In a world in which natural resource extraction is 
often controlled by global transnational corporations, usually headquartered 
outside of the country in which the resource extraction is taking place, the 
capacity of inter-governmental agreements to affect the allocation and pricing 
of minerals is limited.  
Even though China has not been as aggressive as the EU and the US 
in attempting to use PTAs to open the markets of its negotiating partners, the 
potential that such agreements may have to enhance exports at a time when 
China faces growing protectionist pressures in North America and Western 
Europe is clearly an attraction to domestic economic interests. But with the 
exception of the agreement with Hong Kong (which accounts for over 15% of 
China’s total exports), China’s PTA negotiations are taking place with 
relatively minor trading partners. Although Beijing has frequently emphasized 
the potential significance of the combined CAFTA market (the “world’s largest 
FTA”), ASEAN countries together account for only 7% of China’s total 
exports. And, given the zero tariffs of Singapore, ASEAN’s single most 
important market for China, which accounts for 2% of China’s global exports, 
it is not immediately obvious how much its market access will be improved 
when CAFTA is fully implemented (not least because of the vagueness of the 
trade liberalization provisions—their being defined in customary ASEAN 
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fashion as tariffs between zero and five percent—and because of the historic 
reluctance of ASEAN economies to reduce protection of politically sensitive 
industries despite PTA obligations). 
Liberalization of trade in services has not been high on China’s initial 
negotiating priorities in its PTAs—indeed, in several of the agreements, 
negotiations on services have not begun until several years after the treaty on 
goods trade was concluded. China’s reluctance to negotiate on services has 
been a contentious issue in the negotiations with New Zealand and 
particularly Australia, where domestic service industries have lobbied to 
ensure that talks on services occur simultaneously with those on goods. 
Beijing is clearly reluctant to expose weak domestic service industries, 
especially the financial sector, to international competition beyond that to 
which it has already committed in the WTO. China prefers a safety-first 
approach to liberalization, in particular in finance, not least because of its 
memories of the detrimental impact of crises on its neighbours. Beijing also 
argues that the liberalization of telecommunications and cultural services 
sector may endanger its national security if liberalization is not done carefully. 
One of China’s objectives in service negotiations with industrialized 
economies has been to improve the opportunities for Chinese professionals 
to work in partner economies—in the Australian case the focus has been 
particularly on nurses. Apparently Beijing sees PTAs providing a partial 
solution to lack of domestic employment opportunities. 
Beyond these general principles in its PTAs, individual agreements 
have served particular economic purposes. For instance, CAFTA has 
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provided a foundation for infrastructure strengthening and for micro-regional 
development in the Greater Mekong River sub-region in Western China. The 
closer economic partnerships with Hong Kong and Macau, on the other hand, 
are clearly intended to give Chinese networks in these countries an 
advantage over those involving Taiwanese capital that operate across the 
Straits. 
Case Studies 
Case I: China-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) 
On the sidelines of the 14th General Meeting of PECC on 28 November 2001 
(immediately after China and ASEAN had agreed to set up a PTA), Chinese 
Vice Minister of MOFTEC Long Yongtu disclosed that Tung Chee Hwa, Hong 
Kong Chief Executive, had proposed to form a special trade area comprising 
the mainland, Hong Kong and Macau. Then Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
and Premier Zhu Rongji reportedly immediately gave a positive response to 
Tung’s proposal (CASS, 2003; Dong, 2003). Long Yongtu held that the 
establishment of such an area was totally in line with the WTO regulations, 
and this view was supported by Mike Moore, then Director General of the 
WTO, who cited the examples of the EU and NAFTA.8 In December 2001, 
during his annual job report in Beijing, Tung formally submitted proposals to 
the central government to establish a ‘Sino-HK Free Trade Area’. Beijing 
welcomed the proposal but re-named the proposed arrangement a Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), on the grounds that FTAs were 
usually concluded between sovereign countries (CASS, 2003; Peng, 2003). 
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Beijing’s Motivations 
The CEPA was widely considered a ‘big present’ from the mainland to Hong 
Kong, presented upon Premier Wen Jiabao’s first visit in June 2003 (Hu, 
2003). Because Hong Kong had historically positioned itself as a free port, the 
CEPA was largely a one-way opening of trade by the mainland. China 
Customs Administration predicted that HK’s services exports to the mainland 
would increase but the mainland would not gain many economic benefits. 
Trade in goods would not increase by much because the labour-intensive 
products of the mainland already dominated the HK market and most of HK’s 
manufacturing had already moved to the mainland to utilize cheap labour and 
land (Guan, 2005). 
The first objective of the CEPA was to lift Hong Kong’s economy out of 
depression. In 2001, Hong Kong was in one of the worst economic 
depressions in its history after being hit by the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
subsequent global economic slowdown. An economist at the Hong Kong-
Macau Office of China’s State Council pointed out that CEPA could help HK 
maintain production and exports, and expand services trade to deal with the 
adverse external economic environment. 
Secondly, CEPA was intended to give Hong Kong a time advantage 
that would allow its products and companies duty-free access to the mainland 
market earlier than other countries would achieve under China’s WTO 
commitments (Kong, March 2003) (Zhang and Wei, 2004) (Jia, 2005). When 
it became certain in 2001 that China would become a member of the WTO, 
Hong Kong businessmen were worried they would lose their traditional role of 
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being an economic bridge between the mainland and other countries. Some 
Hong Kong companies (in particular small-and medium-sized enterprises), 
academics and professionals in Hong Kong put pressure on the HK 
government to request the mainland central government to grant them 
preferential treatment. According to officials at the China Customs 
Administration and the National Development and Reforms Commission 
(NDRC), Beijing supported the proposal because it considered it an obligation 
to help maintain the prosperity and stability of HK after 1997 (Guan, 2005; 
Kong, March 2003; Peng, 2003).  
Third, Beijing hoped CEPA would help the integration of the mainland, 
HK, Macau and Taiwan. In July 2003, then Chinese Vice Minister of 
Commerce An Min stated that CEPA was “an operationalization of the ‘one 
country, two systems’ strategy.” The advantage of being ‘one country’ is 
shown in opening “earlier than under the WTO, more preferential than for the 
ASEAN”, and “exemplifies the mainland’s support and help to HK’s economy” 
(n.a., 2003). CEPA was regarded as an important step in China’s economic 
integration strategy and the starting point for constructing a ‘Greater China 
Economic Circle’, which would have a greater influence on neighbouring 
countries than the mainland alone does. Beijing hoped CEPA would push 
Taiwan to join the three others through both by providing an example and 
through the increased competition Taiwanese exports would face (CASS, 
2003; Guan, 2005). 
Finally, CEPA might help mainland businesses to enhance their 
productivity. In the speech mentioned above, An Min expected that the 
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agreement would have some negative impact on the mainland economy but 
hoped that mainland sectors would grow through competition and dynamic 
integration with HK businesses, a similar kind of ‘platform’ as the grand 
‘reform and opening’ strategy of Deng Xiaoping after 1978 (CASS, 2003). 
Negotiations and Impact 
Negotiations started in early 2002 but were reportedly not easy because of 
the wide sectoral coverage. Beijing wanted to promote Hong Kong’s interests, 
while keeping the agreement WTO-compliant and keeping in mind the 
possible impacts on the mainland economy as well as other countries’ 
reactions (2003). Addressing some doubts expressed in Hong Kong on the 
prospect of the realization of CEPA, the MOFTEC Minister Shi Guangsheng 
stated on 13 November 2002 that the negotiations were going smoothly 
without major obstacles, and set a target for finalizing the agreement in 2003. 
Later during the SARs epidemic in 2003, the central government decided to 
accelerate the negotiations to alleviate the impact of the crisis on Hong 
Kong’s economy. On 29 June 2003, the CEPA was signed in Hong Kong by 
the new Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and implemented at the start of 2004. 
CEPA is a ‘living’ document to which new content can be added if both Parties 
agree. In subsequent iterations, CEPA II and III, the mainland granted duty-
free entry to more HK products and preferential treatment to additional 
services. 
In manufacturing, because most of HK’s labour-intensive production 
had already moved to the mainland (mostly in the Pearl River Delta), CEPA 
has helped HK keep its ‘niche’ manufacturing sectors. The exports of 
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traditional Chinese medicine, jewellery and watches, chemicals and 
information technology products from HK to the mainland have increased 
since the signing of the CEPA (Zhang and Wei, 2004). Moreover, according 
to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, the agreement has 
encouraged the further development of production networks in which Hong 
Kong produces intermediate goods with competitive technologies and exports 
them to the mainland for further labour-intensive processing (Zhang and Wei, 
2004). 
In services, the agreement opened many service sectors earlier or 
more widely to HK companies and individuals than was available to other 
countries under China’s WTO commitments. This concession was intended to 
reaffirm HK’s position as a gateway for foreign businesses to enter the 
mainland market (Woon, 2003). It led to a mushrooming of Hong Kong 
businesses on the mainland in 2004. A researcher of the NDRC has observed 
that the increasing entrance of HK services expanded the services available 
in the mainland, and brought in business experience to mainland companies 
(Guan, 2005). 
In particular, policymakers and academics in China and HK hold the 
view that the major and long-term benefit of CEPA would mainly be the 
integration of mainland manufacturing and HK’s manufacturing services 
including consultancy, logistics and banking. On the one hand, it helps 
integrate HK’s service sectors closer with its manufacturing bases in 
Guangdong. On the other hand, HK services companies are now allowed to 
work on projects of China’s state-owned companies as well as the mainland’s 
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small and medium enterprises, rather than only on foreign companies and 
joint ventures as before the agreement. HK’s services for manufacturing have 
catered to the needs of manufacturers in the mainland (whether owned by HK 
or the mainland), reduced the cost in services and helped them enhance 
specialization and scale of production. The agreement has facilitated the 
formation of production chains networks between HK and the mainland, so far 
mainly in the Pearl River Delta (Guan, 2006; Guan, 2005; Qu and Li, 2004; 
Zhang, 2006a; Zhang and Wei, 2004; Zhang, 2006b). 
Case II: China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
Initiation and progress 
In the late 1990s, fear of the ‘China threat’ was rampant among ASEAN 
countries. In particular, ASEAN governments worried that when China joined 
the WTO it would out-compete ASEAN’s industries in domestic and export 
markets, and draw away foreign direct investment. At the 2000 ASEAN-China 
Summit in Singapore, ASEAN leaders raised their concerns with the then 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and asked China to pay special attention to their 
economic interests. Zhu responded that China and ASEAN could explore the 
possibility of a free trade relationship, to the surprise of other countries as well 
as his Chinese delegation. (Interviews, Beijing, March 2006)  
Although Chinese officials were surprised by Premier Zhu’s proposal, 
they took swift action to realize this initiative because they understood 
significance of the leadership’s commitment. A year later, a report on 
Economic Cooperation by the China-ASEAN Experts Group was submitted to 
the leaders, and their recommendation of establishing a CAFTA was 
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endorsed. At the next ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002, the leaders 
signed the Framework Agreement on the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation. Because some ASEAN countries doubted the CAFTA would 
bring real benefits to them as China claimed, China proposed an ‘Early 
Harvest Program’ (EHP)—a fast-track trade liberalization of agricultural 
products—to ‘let ASEAN pick the peaches and taste the sweetness first’.9 A 
Sino-Thai FTA on trade in vegetables and fruits, as part of the EHP, was 
signed in 2003 and came into effect on 1 October 2003, earlier than for other 
ASEAN countries. The intention was to accelerate bilateral trade liberalization 
and show other ASEAN countries the potential benefits of the partnership.  In 
November 2004, the Agreement on Trade in Goods, which came into force on 
20 July 2005, and the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms were 
concluded. In January 2007, the Agreement on Services of CAFTA was 
signed at the 10th ASEAN Summit; negotiation on investments is underway. 
Motivations 
It is widely acknowledged among Chinese officials and scholars that the 
motivation of Beijing in proposing a PTA to ASEAN was more political than 
economic. First, China wanted to allay ASEAN’s worries about the 
repercussions of China’s accession to the WTO.10 As part of ‘mulin youhao’ 
[peaceful and friendly neighbourhood] policy, Chinese policymakers hoped 
the CAFTA would stabilise Sino-ASEAN political and economic relations, 
which Beijing saw as crucial in creating a peaceful strategic environment.11 
Second, the CAFTA initiative was regarded as a diplomatic landmark for 
China in taking the leading position in propelling the progress of East Asian 
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cooperation by forging institutional arrangements and making economic 
concessions first. It gave China a diplomatic advantage over Japan. Third, 
China and ASEAN hoped CAFTA would strengthen their voice as a group in 
global trade and economic issues (Xu, Li and Li, 2003). 
As for economic interests, Beijing wished first to guarantee the supply 
of energy and raw materials from ASEAN and, second, to help achieve the 
foreign trade policy objective of diversifying export markets. Chinese trade 
officials thought that CAFTA would be useful to deal with trade protectionism 
in American and Europe, and to reduce the dependence of both parties on 
those markets (Xu, Li and Li, 2003; Zhang, 2004; Zhang and Jianglin, 2003). 
As it did with New Zealand and Australia, China obtained acknowledgment of 
its market economy status (MES) from ASEAN in September 2004, before the 
agreement on goods was signed. Moreover, Chinese policymakers view 
FTAs as an important policy option to create more space for economic 
development. They hoped the enlargement of market size and the 
establishment of market coordination mechanisms in China and ASEAN 
would improve the investment environment and attract more investments from 
outside the region. 
Domestic Coordination 
After the Chinese government announced it would negotiate a PTA with 
ASEAN, not many Chinese sectors other than agriculture were worried. The 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) organised its own study on the potential impact 
of the CAFTA on China’s agriculture. The report was not optimistic for 
producers of tropical produce or raw materials in South China. MOFCOM 
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responded that they should ‘look at the big picture’ and consider the national 
interest; as Premier Zhu directed, ‘we should calculate the political balance 
sheet.” 12 As a result of the EHP, the sudden increase of imported agricultural 
products from ASEAN in the markets bordering ASEAN, in particular in 
Guangxi and Yunnan provinces, caused adverse impacts on local Chinese 
agricultural producers. The MOA and the local government of Guangxi 
Province submitted internal reports to MOFCOM regarding the negative 
effects.13 MOFCOM argued that liberalizing the agricultural industry would be 
beneficial for improving its productivity and competitiveness, and cited the 
positive impacts of liberalization under the WTO on some sectors as a 
precedent. The central government tried to divert attention from costs to 
opportunities by letting Guangxi hold an annual China-ASEAN Expo and 
funding Yunnan’s infrastructure development as part of the Greater Mekong 
River Sub-regional cooperation. 
During the negotiations, a conflict among domestic interests 
sometimes occurred between different parts of a production chain. For 
instance, the reduction of industrial input prices would be detrimental to raw 
material producers but beneficial to processors further down the production 
chain. The trade negotiators would often attend more to the interests of the 
former than to the latter because they thought the negative effects would be 
more severe and more concentrated than the reduction of potential profits for 
processors.14 Moreover, some raw material producers are big state-owned 
enterprises, generally acknowledged to be the companies with the most 
influence on the central government in China. 
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As noted by the China-ASEAN Business Association and economists, 
intra-industry trade has increased significantly between China and ASEAN, 
changing the economic structure of the region.15 China and ASEAN had 
previously largely been competitors in third country markets, but with the 
implementation of the CAFTA, ASEAN increasingly exports raw materials, 
manufactured parts and industrial inputs to China, where they are processed 
and assembled before being exported to third countries (mainly the US and 
the Europe). There is a risk to both ASEAN and China that the products are 
too concentrated in electronics, and the final market is over-dependent on the 
US.16 However, MOFCOM is glad to see that ASEAN’s economic 
dependence on the US, Europe and Japan is gradually being shifted to China 
so that they are ‘bound’ with China. 17
During the process of negotiating and implementing the CAFTA, 
Beijing has learned that FTAs are a useful implement for achieving foreign 
policy goals, and that PTAs are most effective as an instrument when they 
provide substantial benefits so that the other party will increase its economic 
dependency on China.18 Moreover, because CAFTA caused other countries 
to be eager to enter FTAs with China, Chinese policymakers feel that 
championing this agreement has helped increase China’s leverage in FTA 
negotiations with others.  
Case III: Australia-China FTA (AUCFTA) 
Beijing’s motivations for accepting Australia’s proposal 
When China started to embark on free trade agreements (FTAs) in 
international economic cooperation, the Australian government became 
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worried that it would lose out to ASEAN and other countries in the Chinese 
market. The AUCFTA was said to be proposed by Australia during one of the 
high-level visits by Australian leaders to China. (Interviews, Beijing, 2006) 
Political analyses were conducted by China as a preliminary assessment by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR), a quasi-governmental think tank mainly 
concerned with state security issues.  
Both institutions gave positive reports on the state of bilateral political 
relations and on the potential economic and political benefits for China from 
strengthening cooperation with Australia.19 First, the political conditions were 
considered ‘mature’ enough for a PTA. In other words, there was enough 
political trust between the two countries and they did not have “fundamental 
differences”.20 Beijing appreciated Australia as offering First World goods and 
services without “the political baggage that comes with the Americans and the 
Europeans” (Callick, 2004).  Second, Australia was an important country in 
the Southern Pacific as well as the Southern hemisphere. In Beijing’s 
strategic map, Australia belonged to the “big neighbourhood” so the ‘friendly 
neighbourhood’ policy should apply.21 And finally, Beijing felt Sino-Australia 
political relations were not close enough, and hoped the FTA could promote 
political trust, like the China-ASEAN FTA had done. 
There were two major economic motivations for China in negotiating a 
PTA with Australia. First, Beijing hoped the PTA would secure a ‘stable’ 
supply of resources from Australia, since energy security had become a 
priority in China’s foreign economic policy objectives. Beijing believed the 
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Canberra government could constrain company behaviours contrary to its 
interests like raising prices or even switching between contracting partners. 
Besides, the prospective enhanced investment conditions for Chinese 
companies were expected to bring China to a more equal position as 
American investors in resource exploration enjoyed in Australia (because of 
the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement). During the negotiations, Beijing 
demanded that Canberra allow Chinese workers to staff China’s resource 
production chain in Australia, but Canberra has considered this proposal to be 
too intrusive. (Interview, Canberra, 2006) Second, since Australia was the 
demandeur in proposing the PTA, Beijing could ask Canberra to grant China 
market economic status, thereby setting a precedent that it could request the 
EU and the US to follow.22
Upon Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Australia in October 2003, 
the two governments signed the Australia-China Trade and Economic 
Framework (the Framework Agreement), in which they agreed to look into the 
feasibility of a bilateral free trade agreement. The Joint Feasibility Study was 
finished in March 2005, and formal negotiations commenced in April. 
Although the Feasibility Study was accomplished earlier than the October 
target and the leaders of both countries have repeatedly expressed their 
support for the initiative, the progress of Sino-Australian free trade talks has 
been far slower than that between China and ASEAN, Pakistan or Chile. As 
discussed below, domestic resistance, not least in China, and different 
approaches between Beijing and Canberra to the design of PTAs are the two 
main obstacles. The bureaucratic capacity of China for FTA negotiations is 
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another constraint. MOFCOM negotiators have lamented that domestic 
industrial sectors could not provide enough support to the negotiation.23
Domestic resistance 
Major resistance in China to AUCFTA has come from the agricultural and 
services sectors. In agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture has been the most 
stubborn opponent to the prospective liberalization of Chinese agriculture to 
Australia.24 First, they argued that China’s trade negotiators had already 
made too many concessions under the WTO, which had caused major 
damage to Chinese agriculture. Besides, they argued, unlike what they were 
told to believe by the MOFTEC, the competitiveness of Chinese agriculture 
had not increased significantly because of liberalization under the WTO. The 
MOA noted that intra-industry trade in wool textiles had already been 
happening; further tariff reduction through a PTA with Australia would not 
bring much more profit to textile producers but would damage raw material 
producers in China. Moreover, compared with China’s FTA with ASEAN, the 
volume of agricultural trade between China and Australia was much bigger, 
and the geographical area to be affected by the potential FTA was much 
wider—including Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, Shaanxi, Gansu 
and Inner Mongolia, instead of only Guangxi, Yunnan and Hainandao in the 
ASEAN case. Importantly, agricultural issues have become more sensitive in 
China in recent years, marked by rising peasant protests, and therefore the 
government had placed solving ‘three agricultural’ problems—peasant, rural 
area, and agriculture—on the top of the government policies at the 16th 
National People’s Congress in 2004.25 Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce, 
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Ms Ma Xiuhong, flagged in March 2005 that any negotiations with Australia 
over agriculture would be tough because if the government did not handle the 
issue of 740 million peasants properly, it would cause trouble or social 
unrest.26
In services, while Australian services industries have been keen to 
enter the Chinese market, Chinese domestic service providers and relevant 
government institutions have staunchly resisted liberalization beyond WTO 
commitments. Chinese officials at MOFCOM and ministries responsible for 
service industries (including the Banking, Insurance, Securities Regulation 
Commissions, the Ministry of Information and Transportation, the Ministry of 
Transportation, etc.) held that China would honour WTO commitments first, 
judge the impact, and then decide what to do next. This meant no special 
treatment would be granted to specific countries before the completion of the 
implementation of WTO commitments in December 2006. For instance, 
although the central government recognized the necessity of reforming the 
banking sector, it prefers to maintain control of the process and to ensure 
China’s financial security because it believes domestic banks are still 
vulnerable to foreign competition. Beijing is also worried that if it gives 
preferential treatment to Australia, other countries like the US or the EU would 
demand the same treatment on the basis of WTO MFN principles.  
Different approaches to FTA negotiation 
First, China prefers a gradual approach to trade liberalization under the FTA 
while Australia seeks one comprehensive deal. Chinese regulators hold that 
many behind-the-border, or WTO-plus issues, such as IPR, transparency, 
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TBT and SPS, cannot be changed overnight. Australian industries, in 
contrast, believed progress on these issues to be crucial for their business 
with China. Beijing thinks Canberra should agree to a gradual approach.  
Second, usually when China agrees to a proposal for international 
cooperation, the central government argues it will bring both opportunities and 
challenges but on the whole will be beneficial, without making specific 
assessments. In this way, the central decision makers try to dismiss the 
potential costs on both sides. However, the attempt to hide challenges does 
not always succeed. When Australian negotiators presented quantitative 
results of the potential losses to the domestic economy of a PTA, their 
Chinese counterparts were doubtful but could not provide an alternative 
calculation. Chinese negotiators are often in an embarrassing situation at the 
negotiating table when Chinese domestic industrial sectors provide inaccurate 
or inconsistent statistics and offers. 
Conclusion 
China, like other countries, uses PTAs to pursue a variety of foreign policy 
interests. Unlike the PTAs of most other large economies, however, those 
involving China are diverse in their structure and coverage, reflecting the 
variety of diplomatic and economic objectives that Beijing is pursuing through 
its various partnerships. They vary substantially between the vague 
framework agreements signed with ASEAN and Pakistan to the 
comprehensive agreements being negotiated with Australia and New 
Zealand—their comprehensiveness not just a matter of Beijing's choosing but 
also reflecting the preferences of their trading partners. Many LDCs prefer the 
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lack of specificity and obligation of a vague framework rather than the 
legalistic approach that industrialized economies (including Japan) require of 
PTAs—not least because agreements involving the latter are subject to the 
more stringent requirements of the WTO's Article XXIV. 
Of the PTAs that China has concluded or is negotiating, that with Hong 
Kong is the one that was most consciously aimed at the promotion of 
production networks. Moreover, it was designed to give Hong Kong-centred 
networks an advantage over those based in Taiwan. But its impact in 
promoting specifically “Chinese” networks is more questionable. The reason 
is that the CEPA with Hong Kong has a relatively liberal definition of what 
constitutes a Hong Kong company.27 The agreement benefits Hong Kong 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations just as much as local Chinese 
capital. 
More broadly, the impact of the CEPA with Hong Kong on 
manufacturing networks is likely to be limited—primarily because components 
from Hong Kong for assembly in the mainland already entered the market 
duty-free. In fact, components imported from Hong Kong for processing in the 
mainland and for ultimate export are not covered by the CEPA but by the 
mainland's “Regulation on Goods for Processing Trade”. This regulation 
provides for exemption from import duties provided the assembled product is 
exported. The division of labour in manufacturing between Hong Kong and 
the mainland had already been firmly cemented before the CEPA was put into 
place; most labour-intensive manufacturing had migrated North. As noted in 
the case study above, the main impact of the CEPA on production networks is 
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likely to be in facilitating the entry to the mainland market of Hong Kong 
providers of services, perhaps the most important of which are financial 
services to the manufacturing sector. 
How much economic difference PTAs will make is a matter of ongoing 
debate. Low MFN tariff levels, reinforced by provisions such as duty-
drawback schemes and the establishment of free trade zones that facilitate 
trade in components, restrictive rules of origin and the exclusion of politically-
sensitive products from liberalization measures all have the effect of reducing 
the likely overall economic gains from preferential trading agreements. 
China's PTAs may well be as important for their diplomatic repercussions as 
for their economic effects. 
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Table One: China’s Preferential Trade Negotiations 
Partner Did China Initiate? Current Status 
ASEAN 
Y Framework Agreement November 2002. Agreement on Goods began to 
be implemented July 2005; Agreement on Services Signed January 
2007 to enter into force July 2007. PTA to be completed by 2010 (2015 
for “new” ASEAN members). 
Australia N Currently Negotiating (7th Round Dec. 06) 
Brazil Y  
Chile Y Agreement on Goods Implemented Oct. 06; negotiating on services and investment commenced Jan. 07. 
GCC 
Y Framework agreement on economic, trade, investment and technological 
cooperation signed July 2004. Negotiations on PTA continue. 3rd round 
Jan. 2006. 
Hong Kong N Agreement Concluded June 2003 
Iceland N Feasibility Study Completed. Negotiating 
India Y? Second Study Group Appointed Jan. 2007 (Indian government rejected 1st group’s recommendation for PTA). 
Macau N Agreement Concluded October 2003 
New Zealand N Currently Negotiating (10th Round Jan. 07) 
Pakistan  Early Harvest Program 2005. PTA signed Nov. 2006 for July 2007 implementation. 
Peru N Study Group 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization 
Y Proposed Sept. 2003. 
Singapore N Currently Negotiating (previously suspended after Lee visit to Taiwan). 1st round of talks Oct. 2006. 
South African 
Customs Union 
Y Negotiations launched July 2004 
South Korea  Under Study (to be accelerated Jan. 2007) 
Japan & Korea Y Proposed. 
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1 Although the “Chinese” link figured prominently in some of these production networks, particularly those 
involving Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Chinese dimension can easily be overstated given the importance of US-based 
buyer-driven production networks. On China’s role in production networks, see, for instance, Gaulier, Lemoine and 
Ünal-Kesenci (2004), Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2006). 
2 We prefer the term “Preferential Trade Agreements” to either regional agreements or free trade agreements. Even 
though such agreements (when they involve industrialized economies) are referred to the WTO’s Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements for consideration (those involving developing economies exclusively go to the 
Committee on Trade and Development), their membership is often not “regional” in any conventional geographic 
sense of the word. And relatively few of the large number of preferential arrangements negotiated in the last decade 
come close to conventional criteria for “free” trade. 
3 See, for instance, the remarks of Ministry of Commerce spokesman, Chong Quan, in response to criticisms of 
China’s activism in negotiating PTAs made by WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy: Chong asserted that free trade 
agreements were “important supplements” to the WTO, and that the two mechanisms of freeing trade should be 
combined. “China to Advance Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Negotiation”, People’s Daily (16 September 2006). 
4 On the potential for PTAs to accelerate trade liberalization in Japan see Ministry of Economy (2000), Munakata 
(2002). When Chinese officials have made reference to the potentially beneficial effects of international competition, 
this has occurred in response to complaints from domestic sectors fearful that their interests will be damaged by 
relatively inexpensive imports. 
5 See, for instance, “Commonwealth Offers Bright Future for E. Asia”, People’s Daily Online (15 January 2007) 
[http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/15/eng20070115_341324.html] 
6 Friedberg (2006) provides a concise summary of recent increases in China’s import dependence. 
7 Before Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to Beijing in April 2005 to sign the MOU to start 
negotiations, He Yafei, Director of the Department for North America and Oceania at the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
told Australian media that Canberra “can certainly encourage companies to take a long-term point of view in setting 
prices.” (China Daily April 19, 2005) During Hu’s visit to Canberra in October 2003, on the sideline of the 
Framework agreement, the two countries signed a US$30 billion deal to supply 3.3 million tonnes of Australian 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) over 25 years, after a similar AUD$25 billion, 25-year contract of Australian LNG for 
Guangdong province. 
8 “China considering to set up special trade area: Long Yongtu”, People’s Daily (English), 29 Nov. 2001. 
9 Interview with trade officials and academics in Beijing March-May 2006. 
10 Interviews with many academics and officials in Beijing February-June 2006. Also see Zhang and Jianglin (2003) 
11 Interview with a trade official in Beijing on 23 March 2006. Xu, Li and Li (2003) Zhang and Jianglin  Zhang and 
Xiaobing (2003) 
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12 Interview with an expert on ASEAN. 
13 Interviews with officials at the MOA and the Bureau of Commerce of Guangxi. 
14 Interview with a trade official. 
15 Interview with the Director of the Business Association. Also see Ravenhill Ravenhill (2006). 
16 Interview with the Director of the China-ASEAN Business Association. 
17 Interview with trade officials. 
18 Interview with a MOFCOM official in Beijing on 23 March 2006. 
19 Interview with a researcher at the Department of Policy Research of MFA and a researcher at CICIR. Also see 
Yang Yang (2005).. 
20 Interview with a researcher at CICIR, who participated in the preliminary evaluation, 18 April 2006, Beijing. 
21 The small neighbourhood refers to countries adjacent to China including Southeast and Northeast Asia and 
countries bordering China. 
22 A total of 57 countries have accepted China's status as a market economy since New Zealand stood out as the first 
acceptor in April 2004; this group includes Australia, Brazil, South Africa and Russia.   
23 Interview with a MOFCOM official, April 2006, Beijing. 
24 The information on MOA’s views is based on the interviews with MOA officials, May 2006, Beijing. 
25 See “Zhongyang guanyu zengjia nongmin shouru ruogan zhengce de yijian” [The central government’s view on 
policies to increase peasants’ income”, People’s Daily, 9 February 2004. 
26 “China fears FTA’s impact on farming”, ABC Australia, 22 March 2005. 
27 To qualify as a Hong Kong company for the purposes of the agreement, the company must be registered in Hong 
Kong, pay taxes on its profits there, and have 50% of its total employees from Hong Kong. A foreign company is 
regarded as a Hong Kong company one year after merger with or acquisition of a controlling share of a Hong Kong 
company. 
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